Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems by May, Peter J. et al.
  
 
Article 
Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems 
Peter J. May 1, Ashley E. Jochim 2 and Barry Pump 3 
1 Center for American Politics and Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Washington,  
101 Gowen Hall, Campus Box 353530, Seattle, WA 98195, USA; E-Mail: pmay@u.washington.edu; Tel.: +1 
2065432780; Fax: +1 2066852146 
2 Center on Reinventing Public Education, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA; E-Mail: 
aew9@u.washington.edu 
3 Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515, USA; E-Mail: 
barry.pump@mail.house.gov 
How to Cite this Article 
May, P. J., Jochim, A. E., & Pump, B. (2013). Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems. Politics and 
Governance, 1(2), 104-116. 
Acknowledgement 
This Article was published by Librello, Politics and Governance’s former publisher. 
 
About the Journal 
Politics and Governance is an innovative new offering to the world of online publishing in the Political Sciences. An internationally 
peer-reviewed open access journal, Politics and Governance publishes significant, cutting-edge and multidisciplinary research 
drawn from all areas of Political Science. 
www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance 
Editors-in-Chief 
Professor Andrej J. Zwitter, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands 
Professor Amelia Hadfield, Department of Psychology, Politics and Sociology, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK 
Managing Editor 
Mr. António Vieira, Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, Portugal 
Politics and Governance | 2013 | Volume 1 | Issue 2 | Pages 104–116
DOI: 10.12924/pag2013.01020104
Research Article
Political Limits to the Processing of Policy Problems
Peter J. May1,*, Ashley E. Jochim2 and Barry Pump3
1 Center for American Politics and Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, 
101 Gowen Hall, Campus Box 353530, Seattle, WA 98195, USA; E-Mail: pmay@u.washington.edu; 
Tel.: +1 2065432780; Fax: +1 2066852146
2 Center on Reinventing Public Education, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98109, USA; 
E-Mail: aew9@u.washington.edu
3 Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515, USA; 
E-Mail: barry.pump@mail.house.gov
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 21 April 2013 | Accepted: 18 June 2013 | Published: 10 July 2013
Abstract: This contribution addresses political limits to the processing of policy problems in the
United States. Our foci are the forces that limit policymakers' attention to different aspects of
problems and how this affects the prospects for problem resolution. We theorize about three
sets of forces: interest engagement, linkages among relevant institutions for policymaking, and
partisan conflict. We show how the interplay of these forces limits efforts to address complex
problems.  Based  on  secondary  accounts,  we  consider  these  underlying  dynamics  for  ten
complex problems. These include the thorny problems of the financial crisis, climate change,
and health care; the persistent problems of K-12 education, drug abuse, and food safety; and
the looming problems associated with critical infrastructure, the obesity epidemic, ocean health,
and terrorism and extreme events. From these accounts we identify different patterns that we
label fractured, allied, bureaucratic, and anemic policymaking.
Keywords: complex problems; policy processes; policymaking; problem attention
1. Introduction
Policymaking can be thought of as the conversion of
demands  into  authoritative  actions.  The  scholarly
treatment of this spans two different traditions in the
literature about  American politics.  One is  the policy
process  tradition  that  follows  David  Easton's  [1]
depiction of a systems framework that considers the
nature of the demands and policy outputs of the polit-
ical  system but leaves the details  of  the conversion
process largely unspecified. The second tradition opens
the black box by focusing on policymaking institutions
and the processing of demands by presidents, legis-
latures, and the bureaucracy (see for example, [2-4]).
The scholarship associated with both of these tradi-
tions is extensive though largely distinct.
© 2013 by the authors; licensee Librello,  Switzerland. This open access article  was published
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
These traditions of literature overlap in addressing the
organization of policymakers' attention for addressing
policy  problems.  The policy  process  literature about
agenda  setting  is  concerned  with  the  selection  of
demands for policy action. This literature underscores
the  multi-dimensional  nature  of  most  problems  for
which gaining policymaking attention to more-or-less
agreed  upon  dimensions  is  a  noteworthy  hurdle.
Jones and Baumgartner ([5], p. 208) suggest "atten-
tion allocation affects the choice of issues, the choice
of issue characteristics, and the choice of solutions".
But how is attention allocated? A number of scholars
(see [6-8]) have argued that the structure of institu-
tions—particularly committees in Congress and agen-
cies in government—affects the channeling of atten-
tion towards different policy issues. 
A central aspect of how attention is allocated is the
interplay  of  issues  and  interests  among  different
institutions  for  policymaking.  This  interplay  is
inherently  political  as  various  interest  groups  and
partisans  attempt  to  shape  institutional  agendas  to
reflect their concerns (see [9], pp. 49–57; [10]) within
and  across  different  venues  for  policymaking  (see
[11],  pp.  228–231;  [12],  pp.  26–29).  Fragmented
issue attention frustrates the translation of demands
into policies. Unless policymakers are more-or-less on
the same page in addressing a given problem, it  is
difficult  to  move  forward  in  crafting  solutions  for
remedying the problem.
We examine the forces in American national politics
that limit policymakers' attention to different aspects of
problems  and  the  prospects  for  problem resolution.
Jones  and  Baumgartner's  [5]  information-processing
theory of policymaking provides the foundation for our
theorizing.  They  discuss  how  information  overloads
within policymaking institutions lead to a mix of select-
ive and shifting attention across different problems and
different dimensions of a given problem. In addressing
these attention limits, we introduce more explicit con-
sideration of  the channeling of  attention for  a given
problem within and across policymaking institutions.
Our  argument  is  as  follows.  Many  problems  are
multi-dimensional in that they are comprised of inter-
twined bundles of different issues and characteristics.
As  a  consequence,  policymakers  must  grapple  with
diverse  problem formulations  promoted  by  different
policy advocates external to and within government.
The  degree  to  which  interests  are  engaged  and
effectively articulate issues and solutions affects insti-
tutional agendas and the foci of policymakers' atten-
tion. Yet, how that attention is channeled as problems
are processed within and across policymaking institu-
tions differs. In particular, the way in which different
aspects of a problem are parceled out and handed off
to  competing  institutions  either  fosters  or  hinders
policymakers' attention and eventual problem resolu-
tion. Fractured attention is especially noteworthy with
highly partisan issues as policymakers divert attention
through the strategic use of veto points that are built
into  policymaking  institutions.  We  show how policy
problems vary with respect to the interplay of interest
engagement,  the  channeling  of  attention  within
institutions,  and  partisan  conflict.  This  interplay,  in
turn, leads to different patterns of policymaking that
limit  policymakers'  attention  and  the  prospects  for
crafting agreed-upon remedies to policy problems.
2. Conceptual Foundations
The development of a shared understanding of a given
problem is the essence of policymaking—what Heclo
([13], p. 305) refers to as "collective puzzlement on
society's  behalf".  These  shared  understandings  are
shaped by a set of forces that channel policymakers'
attention  for  addressing  and  resolving  policy  prob-
lems. The convergence in attention to particular  di-
mensions of a problem is a critical element. Without
such convergence, as argued by John Kingdon ([9],
pp. 173–204), a policy window for taking action will
not open. Simply put, policymakers need to be on the
same  page  in  order  to  address  a  given  problem.
Problems  that  have  multiple,  competing  dimensions
provide different paths for policymaking as advocates
highlight different dimensions, different congressional
committees claim jurisdiction, and conflicts arise over
the aspects of the problem, if any, to be addressed.
These dynamics fragment policymakers' attention and
frustrate the potential for problem resolution. 
We theorize that interest engagement with a given
issue,  the way that  policymaking institutions are or-
ganized for the issue, and partisan conflict over it are
key forces that limit the attention of policymakers and
the prospects for problem resolution. We elaborate on
these notions and the propositions related to them in
what follows. 
2.1. Interest Engagement and Issue Attention
What draws policymakers' attention to problems in the
first place? Exogenous events that cannot be ignored,
such as an oil spill or hurricane, are one set of influ-
ences (see [14], pp. 131–150; [9], pp. 99–105). But
beyond such events triggering attention to problems,
why does attention get channeled to some aspects of
problems but not to others? For example, the Deep-
water  Horizon  oil  spill  was  about  ocean  health  as
much as it was about the fishing communities of the
Gulf of Mexico. But in the wake of the disaster, policy-
makers' attention focused on BP's reparations to local
economies.  One  truism  of  American  politics  is  that
problems are not addressed unless there are advocates
for addressing them. Though such advocacy is not suf-
ficient to compel action, it is almost always necessary.
Without such advocacy, elected officials or other au-
thoritative actors perceive little benefit in addressing a
given problem, and there is a limited basis for crafting
viable  solutions.  Advocates  also provide  rationales  for
action.
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Interest engagement clearly does not imply agree-
ment  among  the  interests  about  particular  problem
formulations or solutions. Interest advocates for differ-
ent sets of issues often have different beliefs about the
nature of the problem or solutions. As a consequence,
they fall into what Sabatier and Weible [15] depict as
opposing advocacy coalitions. Given divergence in be-
liefs, the likelihood of agreement on the relevant di-
mensions of a problem, or the preferred solutions, is
low. In the face of such conflict, policymakers are re-
luctant to pick "winners" or "losers" in such debates
unless they have a compelling rationale for doing so.
These considerations lead to the proposition:
Proposition 1—Interest Engagement. Policymak-
ing attention is fragmented by the presence of
competing advocacy coalitions and weak policy
communities.
This proposition gets at the makeup of the networks
of interests (see [13]) and the extent to which they
become politically relevant forces in drawing attention
to  a given dimension of  a  problem and providing a
political rationale for addressing it (see [10]). Organ-
ized interests  compete with each other in advancing
issues,  shaping  problem  formulations,  putting  forth
preferred  solutions,  and  lobbying  policymakers  (see
[16]; [9],  pp. 48–74).  The important point from our
perspective  is  how  this  is  sorted  out  across  issues
rather than across interest groups. As Baumgartner and
his  colleagues empirically  demonstrate  ([16],  pp.  1–
28), some issues attract a lot of interest engagement
while others receive little. Though focusing events like
disasters and scandals are presumed to draw attention
to particular issues, Birkland ([14], pp. 62–73) shows
that this only happens in a sustained way when or-
ganized interests exist and are capable of capitalizing
on the focusing event.
Weakly developed issue networks and policy com-
munities characterize some issues (see [17]). As we
show below,  a  variety  of  current  policy  problems—
critical infrastructure, ocean health, and the threat of
terrorism—have weakly  developed publics.  This  res-
ults from insufficient incentives for groups to mobilize
around the  problem,  as  is  especially  the  case  with
public goods. Without political mobilization that spans
dimensions of a given problem, policymakers have a
limited basis for taking policy action.
2.2. Structure of Policymaking and the Channeling of 
Attention
Policymaking institutions channel  attention to issues
differently.  The  ways  these  institutions  shape  how
multi-dimensional problems—those that are comprised
of intertwined bundles of different issues and charac-
teristics—are processed is  of  particular interest (see
[5], pp. 4–17). Climate change is as much about agri-
cultural and forestry practices as it is about fossil fuel
energy consumption. 
Despite the potential for shifts in attention to the
issues that are deemed important at any point in time,
it is useful to remember that the allocation of atten-
tion across issues is highly organized within American
policymaking  institutions.  Procedural  rules  formally
define jurisdictions within Congress, though commit-
tees compete for turf (see [18]) and agencies have
defined areas of expertise and reputations to defend
[19]. As a consequence, the collective puzzling about
problems  is  often  parceled  out  in  structured  ways
within and among policymaking institutions. This per-
mits the efficient handling of large numbers of prob-
lems but also limits the treatment of complex, multi-
dimensional problems. This is because different policy-
making institutions (different committees in Congress
and different agencies) focus on different dimensions
or attributes of a given problem.
How attention is channeled for different attributes
of a problem within and among policymaking institu-
tions  affects  the  foci  of  policymakers'  attention.  Of
particular relevance is the degree to which actors in
different policymaking institutions are connected and
interdependent. We think of institutional interdepend-
encies as the extent to which actors dealing with as-
pects of a given problem overlap or are linked through
regular agency or committee interactions (see [20]),
share ideas or policy goals as with boundary-spanning
regimes (see [21]), or have "policy proximity" provided
by shared policy tools or other features (see [22], p.
20). These institutional alignments condition patterns
of attention, and at the same time they embody past
patterns  of  political  conflict  and agreement.  In  this
respect, the institutional channeling of attention is at
least partially conditioned on prior patterns of policy-
making for a given issue.
The  distinction  between  serial  and  parallel  pro-
cessing  of  information  is  especially  relevant  (see
[23]). Highly interdependent institutions are subject to
serial processing of information as policymakers hand
off  problems  through  more-or-less  regularized  chan-
nels. Consider the financial crisis of 2008 that began
as a banking crisis and rapidly cascaded into a crisis
for insurance, securities and fiscal policy. Not only are
these issues interrelated but the policymaking institu-
tions that deal with them are tightly linked (see [24]).
Actors in less interdependent policymaking institutions
do not have patterns of interaction that establish reg-
ularized information flows among them. Contrast the
financial crisis with the disruptions following the ter-
rorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent policymaking. In
studying  the  policy  reverberations  of  the  terrorism
threat, May, Sapotichne and Workman [25] show that
policymakers  in  different  committees  in  Congress
worked through their sense of the problem and viable
solutions in a disconnected fashion.
Policymakers  in  interdependent  institutions  have
advantages  in  forming  policy  responses  to  complex
policy problems. Resolution of the problem becomes a
shared  undertaking  as  the  fate  of  political  actors
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becomes linked as a result of their common connec-
tions (see [26]). At the same time, the involvement of
regularized sets of players leads to the treatment of
problems in a similar manner to the past. This is be-
cause the "usual  suspects" often wear blinders that
limit  the  incorporation  of  new information  and per-
spectives in problem processing. In other words, the
structure of institutional interactions matters for how
information about policy problems is processed. When
a problem or event falls outside "standard operating
procedure", interdependent institutions may lack the
capacity  to  adapt  their  structure  and  respond  in  a
timely manner. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2a—Interdependent Institutions. Poli-
cymaking  attention  is  constrained  when  highly
interdependent institutions limit the capacity of
policymakers  to  confront  new  or  unexpected
problems.
For example, in attempts to address the financial
crisis of 2008, power coalesced around the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve  Board  of  Governors  because  the  tightly  knit
congressional structure designed to deal with banking
issues could not process all the elements of the crisis
in a timely manner. In contrast to the "land rush" ob-
served in other crises (see [27]), where committees
with varying interests each tried to claim jurisdiction
over a particular aspect of the problem, the financial
crisis  was  characterized  by  a  streamlined  decision-
making process with all the congressional stakeholders
at,  sometimes  literally,  the  same table  with  admin-
istration and bureaucratic officials (see [28], pp. 442–
443). Despite the potential for turf wars due to over-
lapping  jurisdictions  (e.g.,  Financial  Services  with
Judiciary  on  bankruptcy  or  Financial  Services  and
Energy and Commerce on consumer issues), Congress
essentially  abdicated  its  oversight  and policymaking
functions at the height of the crisis, as evinced during
the 2010 midterm elections when incumbents struggled
to  explain  their  votes  for  the Troubled  Asset  Relief
Program and other bailouts. 
Proposition  2b—Loosely-Linked Institutions.  For
problems processed in loosely linked institutions,
policymaking attention is fragmented by institu-
tional conflicts. 
Institutional conflicts are more likely to arise when
attention to problems is parceled out among less in-
terdependent  institutions.  This  is  because  actors  in
competing institutions (committees and agencies) at-
tempt  to  define  the  dimensions  of  the  problem at
hand and available solutions to fit their purview (see
[5], pp. 55–70; [9], pp. 99–105). Jurisdictional com-
petition in Congress and within the bureaucracy acts
as a disintegrative force as loosely-linked political in-
stitutions pull policymaking in different directions (see
[11]; [29],  pp. 193–215; [30]). External shocks like
9/11 can lead to spillovers  in  attention  as different
players see connections between the focal event (e.g.,
an airplane crashing into the World Trade Center) and
issues of concern to them (e.g., potential poisoning of
the food supply). Yet, the attention is uneven across
policymaking institutions given that they vary in their
susceptibility to the disruption and ability to generalize
from it. The net result of such institutional conflict is
to  increase  the  potential  for  impasse,  delays,  and
disjunctions in policymaking.
2.3. Partisan Conflict and Veto Points
Policy problems differ in the extent to which they en-
gender partisan conflict. Some problems such as the
obesity epidemic and drug abuse are valence issues
for which there is little debate about the desirability of
acting but conflict  over the role of government and
appropriate  interventions  (more  generally  see  [11],
pp. 150–171). Other problems such as climate change
engender varied patterns of partisan conflict over the
problem and solutions. In generating a "heated up"
policy space, partisan conflict fosters an unstable poli-
cymaking environment. Each set of competing issue
dimensions presents opportunities for partisan policy
entrepreneurs to take advantage of veto points that
are built into the institutions of policymaking. Skillful
use of these hurdles can frustrate policymaking. This
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3—Partisan Conflict and Veto Points.
Partisan conflict increases the strategic import-
ance of veto points and fragments policymaking
attention. 
This proposition addresses the way that members
of  opposing political  parties  have  increasingly  taken
advantage of the multiple veto points inherent in the
American  political  system  to  frustrate  policymakers'
attention. This has expanded beyond the use of com-
mittee power in order to block bills in Congress. There
has been increased use of procedural rules to modify
the extent of debate and filibusters in the Senate to
block policy enactment (see [31]). These mechanisms
have both direct effects in delaying or blocking policy
action  and  indirect  effects  in  advocates'  reshaping
policy proposals in order to avert partisan use of pro-
cedural  maneuvers.  Daniel  Carpenter  ([32],  p.  825)
refers to the combined effect of this as "institutional
strangulation"  derived  from  "strategies  of  partisan
intransigence".
Consider recent attempts to modify financial regu-
lations in the wake of the 2008 crisis. The proposed
new regulations spanned multiple issues from the size
of banks to the creation of open exchanges for trading
derivatives. In about a month and a half of considera-
tion in the U.S.  Senate, only a handful of contested
votes did not fall largely along party lines. Indeed, even
the definition of "financial company" was subject to a
party-line vote (see [33]). This illustrates how partisan
conflicts often begin as ideological disagreements but
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spill  over into the more mundane aspects of policy-
making when there are perceived electoral returns on
disagreement. 
We theorize that the effect of partisan intransigence
in undermining problem resolution differs when issues
are processed serially or in parallel. Under serial pro-
cessing, where the resolution of issues is handed-off
among connected policymaking institutions, any single
veto point  in  the chain  is  a  source of  delay,  if  not
blockage of problem resolution. Policy entrepreneurs
must work hard to eliminate the veto points or to gain
sufficient  consensus  to  overcome  them.  Carpenter
([32], p. 828) discusses how this played out for finan-
cial reform in the Obama Administration in document-
ing  how provisions  in  the  House  bill  were  "watered
down and in some cases abjectly voted down" by those
promoting reform in order to press ahead. Moreover,
Carpenter ([32], p. 830) suggests that the associated
policy networks and agencies that are tightly linked in
financial  policymaking  form  less  formal  veto  points:
"the veto points are not necessarily those of Congress,
but those of administrative and advisory politics. In this
networked world,  ideas are more likely  to  disappear
from the agenda not with research, but because they
are deemed outside of the set of 'legitimate' ideas".
Partisan forces are also at work for the parallel pro-
cessing of issues. But here the structure of policymak-
ing  works  to  limit  the  importance  of  a  single  veto
point and enables "work arounds". Consider the evol-
ution of  homeland security  policy  after  the  terrorist
attacks  of  11th  September  2001.  Policymakers  in
different  committees  in  Congress  worked  through
their sense of the problem and viable solutions in a
disconnected  fashion,  which  led  to  the  creation  of
issue-specific  legislation such as the creation of the
Transportation Security Administration for transporta-
tion security [34] and passing the Public Health Secur-
ity  and Bioterrorism Response  Act  of  2001 [35] for
biosecurity.  This  is  far  different  than  creation  of  a
comprehensive homeland security reform. Even when
that came later with the enactment of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 [36], numerous—largely discon-
nected—committees in Congress were involved, lead-
ing to both the kind of turf fights we cite above as
endemic to parallel processing and also the piecemeal
patching together of different provisions (see [37], pp.
689–700).
3. Varieties of Problems
We examine ten complex problems in order to charac-
terize  the  interplay  of  interest  engagement,  institu-
tional channeling of attention, and partisan politics in
limiting  policymakers'  attention  to  particular  dimen-
sions of a problem and resultant problem resolution.
We selected these cases with several considerations in
mind.  We  only  selected  contemporary  domestic
problems.  This  provides a current  perspective  rather
than a historical one. In order to provide meaningful
comparisons,  we selected cases to ensure  sufficient
variation among the three forces we consider. We also
sought cases that  reflected different problem areas.
Finally, we sought cases for which there is an avail-
able  academic  and policy  literature that  depicts  the
politics surrounding the problem and efforts to resolve
it. This included a review of relevant scholarly literat-
ure  in  political  science  and  public  administration,
policy digests by government analytic agencies (mainly
Congressional Research Service, General Accountabil-
ity Office), and policy digests by independent sources
(mainly CQ Researcher and CQ Almanac).
Our evidence for the political processing of these is
drawn from the secondary accounts. For each case, we
developed a profile that characterized the nature of the
problem  and  evidence  for  linkages  among  relevant
policymaking institutions, the engagement of different
publics, and the extent and forms of partisan conflict
surrounding  the  problem  and  its  resolution.  These
assessments are necessarily impressionistic because of
the variation with which the source material addresses
the characteristics of interest for our research. 
We  assessed  institutional  linkages  by  looking  for
evidence of commonalities among committees in Con-
gress, the White House,  and the bureaucracy when
they addressed the problem or considered solutions.
An  example  of  stronger  linkages  is  the  interplay
between the Treasury Department, Federal  Reserve,
and Congressional banking committees in addressing
the cascading effects of the fiscal crisis. An example
of weaker linkages is the parallel policy development
among different sectors for addressing the protection
of critical infrastructures. 
We assessed the degree of engagement of differ-
ent  interest  groups  and  other  policy  publics  when
they addressed each problem or advocated solutions.
The  extent  to  which  these  groups  advocated  for
similar problem formulations and solutions is of par-
ticular  relevance. Finally,  we considered various  as-
pects of partisan conflict. The degree of partisan con-
flict is affected by the extent of ideological polarization
and the electoral importance of an issue for the ma-
jority party's legislative coalition. Electoral importance
is a significant dimension of partisan conflict because
it affects a majority coalition's willingness to address
an issue (i.e., put it on the agenda) and the opposing
party's willingness to counter-mobilize and draw po-
tentially advantageous distinctions. Health care reform
illustrates  this  as  ideological  polarization  between
political parties is exacerbated by the electoral signific-
ance of the issue, which results in an unusually high
degree of conflict. Issues characterized by the weakest
degree of partisan conflict demonstrate little polariza-
tion and are low among the parties'  policy priorities
while  issues characterized by the greatest  degree of
partisan  conflict  are  both  highly  polarizing  and  key
electoral issues. 
Relevant features of the different policy problems
we considered are arrayed in Figure 1.
108
Figure  1. Policymaking  features  of  selected  policy  problems.  Circles  indicate  the  degree of  partisan
conflict over an issue or solution—darker shading indicates greater conflict.
The  horizontal  axis  depicts  the  strength  of  linkages
among relevant  institutional  actors,  keeping  in  mind
that the number of relevant institutions (i.e., commit-
tees in Congress, federal agencies) varies among the
selected problems. The vertical axis depicts the strength
of engagement of different interests. The shading of
the circles next to each issue label indicates the extent
of partisan conflict with darker circles depicting greater
conflict.  Given  the  imprecision  of  measuring  each  of
these, it is best to consider the location of each problem
as a relative comparison rather than an absolute one.
Several points stand out from this comparison. One
is the variation in the political and policymaking charac-
teristics of these problems. Some, such as health care
and  K-12  education,  have  well-established  policy-
making venues with engaged publics and moderate to
high degrees of partisan conflict. Others, like critical in-
frastructure and ocean health, are more disconnected
in their policy treatment  with limited engagement of
policy  publics  and  low  levels  of  partisan  conflict.  A
second observation is that nearly three-quarters of the
problems can be labeled valence issues involving the
lessening of harms. Yet, unlike typical valence issues,
there  is  partisan  debate  for  a  number  of  these
problems about the extent and timing of future harms
and thus the need to act now or in a comprehensive
fashion. Contrast the immediacy and the rush to act
during  the  financial  crisis  with  the  more  glacial  ap-
proach  and  uncertainties  surrounding  approaches  to
addressing global climate change. A third observation is
the interplay of partisan conflict with the other dimen-
sions we consider. Higher degrees of partisan conflict
are associated with stronger  engagement  of  publics,
perhaps reflective of the increased salience of the is-
sues and the more entrenched beliefs about the prob-
lem or solutions. The strength of institutional linkages
appears to be only loosely related to partisan conflict. 
The cases suggest four broad patterns of policymak-
ing. Those that fit within each pattern are identified by
dividing each axis in two so as to provide four quad-
rants: Two cases in the upper left (climate change and
terrorism and extreme events), three in the upper right
(economic  crisis,  health  care,  and  K-12  education),
three  in  the  lower  right  (drug  abuse,  food  safety,
obesity epidemic), and the remaining two cases in the
lower  left  (ocean  health  and  critical  infrastructure).
Based on our reading of the secondary literature con-
cerning these problem areas, we identify four fairly dis-
tinctive policymaking patterns. It is important to recog-
nize that there is variation among cases within each of
these quadrants in part due to differences in the extent
of  partisan  conflict.  The  policymaking  patterns  and
resultant limits to problem resolution are summarized
in Table 1 and elaborated in the following discussion.
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Table 1. Policymaking patterns and their limits.
Institutional Linkages
Weak Strong
Engagement
of Publics
Strong
Fractured Policymaking
• High salience
• Disintegrative politics
• Partial resolution
Allied Policymaking
• High salience
• Coalition politics
• Unstable resolution
Weak
Anemic Policymaking
• Low salience
• Seemingly apolitical
• Lacking resolution
Bureaucratic Policymaking
• Low salience
• Turf politics
• Deferred resolution
3.1. Fractured Policymaking
The two cases  in  the  upper  left  quadrant  comprise
what  we  label  fractured  policymaking;  marked  by
highly  engaged  interests  that  emphasize  different
aspects of a given problem, moderate to high partisan
conflict,  and weak institutional  linkages.  The strong
engagement  of  publics  increases  the  salience  and
political stakes of these issues, adding to their frac-
tured politics. The disorganized and haphazard issue
attention is a result of weak institutional linkages and
the  parallel  processing  of  different  issue  attributes
among different institutions (especially committees in
Congress).  The  result  is  attention  to  a  particular
dimension of a problem rather than to the interplay of
multiple dimensions. These dynamics are evident from
considering the two cases in this quadrant.
Most  discussions  of  climate  change  highlight  the
interplay of the physical  and socio-economic dimen-
sions  of  the evolving problem, the  uncertainty  over
the extent of the problem, and the difficulties of pro-
jecting future impacts (see [38]). For our purposes,
however, the important considerations are the political
and policymaking limits to addressing the problem in
an integrative fashion. We attribute failure to achieve
comprehensive approaches in the United States to the
forces that undermine problem resolution. One is the
weak ties  among relevant actors in different policy-
making institutions  (primarily  different  congressional
committees), which consider different aspects of the
problem—principally,  Agriculture,  Energy  and  Com-
merce, Natural Resources, Small Business, and Taxa-
tion (see [39]). In essence, policymakers are acting in
parallel with different agendas, timelines, and foci. By
definition,  this fragments attention. Second, the ex-
tensive engagement of different coalitions addressing
aspects of the problem and advocating solutions un-
dermines  reform  efforts.  As  discussed  by  McCright
and Dunlap [40],  this  was especially  evident in  the
efforts of different coalitions to defeat the ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol. The third force, which has been
noteworthy for limiting the enactment of reforms, is
the high degree of partisan conflict at national levels
over climate change issues. Dunlap and McCright [41]
document the partisan split in the general public and
within Congress, as Republicans are increasingly re-
luctant to address the problem.
The  terrorist  attacks  of  11th  September  2001
clearly elevated the threat of terrorism on the policy
agenda and focused policymakers'  attention  to  that
threat and potential spillover concerning such things
as the safety of the food supply and threats to public
health. May, Sapotichne and Workman [25] empiric-
ally demonstrate the policymaking responses to these
threats were highly disjunctive in that different con-
gressional committees worked through their sense of
the  problem and  viable  solutions  in  a  disconnected
fashion. The end result was a set of policies that re-
flected  the  different  agendas,  constituencies,  and
political concerns of the various committees and fed-
eral agencies that addressed different risks. The cre-
ation of the Department of Homeland Security provided
a hobbled approach to coordinating these efforts with
an agency that was stitched together in a haphazard
manner (see [42,43]). The failures of the response to
Hurricane Katrina highlighted the singular focus of the
homeland security efforts on terrorism at the expense
of ignoring the threats posed by natural and technolo-
gical disasters. The end result of this policymaking is
what May, Jochim and Sapotichne [44] characterize as
a weak policy  regime.  Despite  the evident  limits  of
this  regime,  the  homeland  security  apparatus  has
been  sustained  politically  by  partisan  coalitions  in
Congress who benefit from fomenting concerns about
terrorism (more generally see [45], pp. 78–110).
3.2. Allied Policymaking
The three cases in the upper right quadrant comprise
what  we  label  allied  policymaking;  marked  by  high
salience and fairly  contentious  partisan  conflict,  but
supportive reform coalitions. Partisan politics strongly
influenced these issues as they were mainly serially
processed within interdependent policymaking institu-
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tions. The result is what we label unstable problem
resolution. In each instance the problems narrowed—
K-12 education focused on accountability, health care
focused on access (as opposed to cost reduction), and
financial reform focused on stability (with less atten-
tion to systemic risk). This narrowing allowed for poli-
cymaking around key aspects of each problem while
also  disappointing  advocates  concerned  with  other
problem aspects,  thereby  undermining  the  reforms.
For the cases of health care and financial reform, the
partisan use of veto points led to further instability,
which resulted in adjustments that weakened the re-
forms. These dynamics are evident from considering
each of the three cases in this quadrant.
The politics and policymaking for K-12 education is
marked by a fairly stable policy community that has
operated for decades at the federal, state, and local
levels involving key players like teachers' unions, ex-
perts and researchers, civil  rights organizations, and
bureaucrats.  Though there have been sharp divides
among the players over a range of K-12 issues (see
[46]), reform coalitions have formed at various points
in time among key allies within the K-12 policy com-
munity—most notably for the enactment of No Child
Left Behind in 2001. In this regard, Paul Manna [47]
discusses how the sharing of ideas and the linkages
across  different  venues  of  policymaking  fostered
changes in the national education agenda along with
a narrowing of that agenda. Patrick McGuinn [48] ad-
vances this understanding by showing how the power
of ideas such as accountability, standards, and testing
took hold at a time of increased concern about educa-
tional  performance.  As  attention  converged  on  ac-
countability,  reformers  largely  overcame  traditional
bases  of  opposition.  Presidential  advocacy  provided
additional momentum for accountability-based reform.
All of this was accomplished in a bipartisan manner,
although this masked the underlying disorder gener-
ated  by  conflicts  involving  teachers'  unions,  some
state governors, and other educational reform advoc-
ates. The subsequent backlash to K-12 accountability
underscores  the  fragility  of  such  coalitions  (more
generally see [49], pp. 29–33).
The saga of health care reform, which began in the
run-up to the  2008 election and continued through
the  enactment  of  comprehensive  reforms  in  March
2010, epitomizes the political and policymaking com-
plexities  of  allied  policymaking.  The  long  history  of
failed health care reforms in the United States is, as
David Wilsford [50] points out,  marked by powerful
government institutions and conflicting interests (also
see [51]). Theda Skocpol's [52] insightful depiction of
the failures of the Clinton health care reform further
underscores the challenges of creating a reform coali-
tion in Congress and a strong constituency for a par-
ticular plan. As analyzed by Jacob Hacker  [53],  the
quest for consequential reform seemed to define the
Obama administration's efforts to avoid the pitfalls of
the Clinton reform and Congress's efforts  to craft a
viable coalition in support of increasingly less-compre-
hensive  reforms—albeit  with  shifting  definitions  of
what constituted meaningful reform. In essence, the
"comprehensive" reform became a "stitched-together"
reform in search of a viable allied coalition. A major
constraint throughout was the partisan divide in Con-
gress over reform, which continues today with prom-
ises  by  conservative  Republicans  to  dismantle  the
enacted reforms.
The regulatory overhaul of the financial system in
2010 further illustrates allied politics with the added
pressures of an extraordinary crisis in the global finan-
cial system. Banks stopped lending and the problems
facing the financial industry led to the worst economic
downturn since the Great Depression. In this regard,
the effects of the problem were widely felt, to put it
mildly. Yet, the policymaking that ensued did not re-
flect this degree of disruption, as linked-players within
the banking, finance, and securities subsystems en-
gaged  in  serial  processing  of  the  problem.  Perhaps
more than for any other contemporary problem, these
players were acutely aware of their "shared fate" in
crafting reform. As Congleton [54] notes, policymak-
ing to deal with the financial crisis and its underlying
causes was remarkably routine given how the urgency
of  the  crisis  permeated  the  discourse  and  decision
making of policy actors. Williams [55] suggests this is
due to the tight linkages among relevant players with
few  new  players  entering  the  policy  discussion.  As
discussed  by  Carpenter  [32],  competing  ideological
visions  for  the  role  of  government  in  the  economy
dominated the partisan conflict over policy responses.
Minority-party Republicans perceived electoral  returns
on disagreement  with  majority-party  Democrats,  and
the high level of polarization led to tremendous gridlock
but  for  a  small  group of  moderate Republicans who
made increasingly less-comprehensive reform possible.
3.3. Bureaucratic Policymaking
The three cases in the lower right quadrant comprise
what we label bureaucratic policymaking; marked by
moderate to low partisan conflict that plays out mostly
in the policymaking backwaters, occasional high-level
attention,  and  reliance  on  experts  to  drive  policy
change.  The weaker engagement of  publics  reflects
the generally low salience of these issues. As a con-
sequence, the subject matter experts within govern-
ment  and  specialized  organizations  that  follow  the
issues provide the impetus for action and the sources
of policy reform, which results in policymaking that is
deferred, but not explicitly delegated, to the adminis-
trative branch. At times, as with each of the cases we
consider, there is higher-level intervention on the part
of  presidents  seeking  coordinated  action  among
President  agencies. Though  Congress  has  been  in-
volved  in  holding  hearings  and  considering  reforms,
most of the policymaking for these issues has involved
new regulations or administrative efforts to better co-
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ordinate  agency  actions.  These  dynamics  are  evident
from considering each of the three cases in this quadrant.
The politics of drug abuse policy is not as straight-
forward as it appears. On the one hand, it is a classic
macro-political  issue driven by presidential initiatives
that began in 1971 with Nixon's War on Drugs and
continued  as  a  mainstream  aspect  of  presidential
politics in future elections (see [56]; [57], pp. 34–73).
Few political actors seem to be able to resist punitive
attitudes given the dynamics of a highly salient issue
coupled  with  a  weak  and  powerless  target  group.
However, as much as macro political attention seems
to dominate efforts to define the drug problem, there
is also an "inside-the-beltway" component driven by
the  prominent  role  that  federal,  state,  and  local
criminal justice bureaucrats play in policymaking (see
[58]). As shown by Meier and Smith [59], the durabil-
ity of drug use criminalization has been reinforced by
the  powerful  set  of  interlocking  federal,  state,  and
local enforcement agencies, with strong federal fund-
ing and access at local levels to asset seizures made
under the Crime Control Act of 1984. The countervail-
ing forces of public health advocates who argue for
drug  treatment  programs  have  gained  traction  at
various points in time, but they are generally politic-
ally weaker than the criminal justice advocates.
The safety of food in the United States is a problem
that  receives  episodic  attention in  the aftermath  of
different scares which attract media attention. Begin-
ning with the Meat  and Poultry  Act  of  1906,  which
followed Upton Sinclair's depiction of the stockyards of
Chicago, food safety has been marked by a patchwork
system of laws, regulations, and responsible authorit-
ies,  which  largely  grew  out  of  efforts  to  address
specific  health  threats  from particular  food sources,
rather than some coherent, over-arching master plan
(see [60]). There have been presidential and congres-
sional efforts to bring about comprehensive reform of
food safety regulation (see [61]). The most notable
among  these  was  the  long-sought  passage  of  the
Food  Safety  and  Modernization  Act  in  2010  [62].
Though the reform is notable in giving the FDA ex-
panded powers and reducing the bureaucratic confu-
sion in food safety inspection, the same forces that
conspired to impede prior reforms worked to limit key
aspects of the 2010 reform. Chief among these are a
powerful industry alliance of food producers and pack-
ers that has raised concerns about the costs of  re-
forms and challenged new regulations in the courts
(see [63]). Consumer and environmental groups have
had only  limited  effectiveness  in  advocating  for  re-
forms. Given the insufficient political basis for compre-
hensive  reform,  change  has  been  typically  accom-
plished through the regulatory process. The exception
is the 2010 reform that was blocked in the Senate for
over  a  year,  but  pushed  through  with  a  bipartisan
Senate vote (73–25) in the wake of a massive recall of
more  than  a  half-billion  tainted  eggs.  Reform  ad-
vocates were able to take advantage of this although
the reform will take years to implement and depend
on additional funding to carry it out.
The problem of obesity has received much atten-
tion in the media and health circles in recent years in
the United States. Despite increased attention to the
problem by public health advocates, there appears to
be little concern on the part of the broader citizenry
and traditional ideological or partisan divisions do not
seem to apply at national levels (see [64]). As in the
politics of food safety, strong food industry interests
and their supporters have muted advocates for com-
prehensive policy (see [65]). States and localities have
filled the void with a patchwork of regulatory actions.
But,  as  noted  by  social  policy  observers  Kersh  and
Morone [66], gaps and regulatory inconsistencies have
led  advocates  to  renew  calls  for  coherent  national
approaches.  As for  the drug abuse and food safety
problems, high-level executive branch intervention—in
this case a White House Task Force led by Michelle
Obama—has attempted to bring about greater policy
coherence for addressing childhood obesity. That initi-
ative sets a goal of solving the problem of childhood
obesity in a generation, commits federal agencies to a
number of  administrative  actions in  support  of  that
goal,  and establishes a variety  of  partnerships  with
advocacy and private-sector organizations.
3.4. Anemic Policymaking
The remaining two cases in the lower left  quadrant
comprise what we label anemic policymaking because
of the lack of impetus for addressing them and a lim-
ited basis for problem resolution. Sustained attention
to  such  issues  is  typically  limited  to  narrow  policy
communities  around  vague  problem  conceptualiza-
tions. These are the most difficult problems to address
from a political perspective. The difficulties arise from
several  sources.  One  is  the  disconnection  between
players  addressing  aspects  of  the  problem.  Absent
macro-political intervention by presidents or congres-
sional leaders, usually in the wake of a major crisis,
there is little basis for agreement about the problem
or  its  resolution.  Even  in  the  aftermath  of  major
crises,  reform  efforts  can  be  piecemeal  and  short-
lived. Unlike allied policymaking, there is little basis for
forming  an  effective  coalition  in  support  of  reform.
Like  bureaucratic  policymaking,  these  issues  are
largely  within  the  domain  of  substantive  policy  ex-
perts. The relative lack of partisan conflict might be
viewed as positive. Yet the lack of broader-based pub-
lics undermines the impetus for action. These dynam-
ics are evident from considering aspects of the three
cases in this quadrant.
Though two major commissions have recently high-
lighted the seriousness of the decline of ocean health
—the  Pew  Oceans  Commission  [67]  and  the  U.S.
Commission  of  Ocean  Policy  [68]—progress  in  ad-
dressing this problem has been halting and piecemeal.
The Pew Oceans Commission report ([67], p. viii) suc-
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cinctly states: "plagued with systemic problems, U.S.
ocean governance is in disarray". The disarray reflects
the institutional layering of responsibilities ranging from
environmental conditions, to fisheries management, to
international trade that the Pew report notes constitute
more than 140 laws involving at least six cabinet-level
departments and dozens of agencies. 
But why has such reform been stymied, given the
seeming consensus about the need for it? The answer,
we argue, is the lack of engagement among a broader-
based set of publics. In this regard, Sarah Chasis ([69],
p.  A20) of  the  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council
notes  that  progress  is  stymied  by  "too  few  ocean
champions on the Hill, the lack of a strong administra-
tion  leadership,  tight  budget  times,  and  a  lack  of
public awareness". At the same time there has been
little partisan or interest group conflict over the need
to address these problems. The lack of partisanship is
evinced by Bush administration appointments to the
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and by the Obama
administration's  formation  of  the  National  Ocean
Council  for  coordinating  governmental  programs.
Though  these  issues  have  reached  the  presidential
agenda, they are notably absent  from the congres-
sional  agenda.  As  suggested  by  the  actions  of  the
Obama administration, future change for ocean policy
may  look  more  like  bureaucratic  policymaking  than
reform policymaking.
Attention  to  the  security  of  the  nation's  critical
infrastructure—banking  and  communications,  chem-
ical plants, energy facilities, government facilities and
other  "critical  assets"—has  also  been dominated by
presidential actions, beginning in 1996 with President
Clinton's  appointment  of  the Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection. Subsequent documents have
had varied definitions of what constitutes critical infra-
structure  involving  a  plethora  of  different  federal,
state, and private entities (see [70]). The engagement
of different interests has been very uneven and highly
disbursed among the different types of critical facilit-
ies that are designated within the federal "partnership
plan"  for  addressing  critical  infrastructure.  This  un-
evenness  undermines the ability  to bring about  co-
ordinated action in support of a national approach to
the problem. As noted by Myriam Dunn ([71], p. 260),
in  discussing  one  aspect  of  the  problem,  critical
information protection "has become an issue of high
relevance to many different, very diverse, and often
overlapping communities. These different groups, be
they private, public, or a mixture of both, usually do
not agree on the nature of the problem or on what
needs to be protected. Depending on their influence
or  on  the  resources  at  hand,  various  key  players
shape the issue in accordance with their view of the
problem".  Here  the  limits  are  as  much  within  the
private sector as they are within the public sector. As
with ocean policy, the politics of infrastructure protec-
tion are played out by experts and with little or no
partisan rancor. The result is a policy path defined by
bureaucratic  inertia  around  "partnership  planning"
that has evident disjunctions.
4. Conclusions
The preceding discussion helps to identify the forces
in American politics which conspire to fragment policy-
makers' attention to different aspects of problems and
thereby  limit  the  prospects  for  problem  resolution.
Perhaps the most important point is that these forces
vary  considerably  in  their  significance  for  different
types of problems. Fractured policymaking, as found
for  climate  change  and  the  threat  of  terrorism,  is
marked by disintegrative politics, moderate to strong
partisan conflict,  and partial  policy resolution.  Allied
policymaking, as found for the financial crisis, health
care, and K-12 education, is marked by high salience,
fairly  contentious  partisanship,  and  unstable  policy
resolution. Bureaucratic  policymaking, as found with
the  national  drug  abuse  problem,  lapses  in  food
safety, and the obesity epidemic, is marked by moder-
ate to low partisan conflict, reliance on experts and
bureaucrats as the drivers of policy change, and de-
ferred policy resolution to the administrative branch.
Anemic  policymaking,  as  found  for  the  problems  of
declining ocean health and the vulnerability of critical
infrastructures, is marked by low salience, weak and in-
sufficiently developed publics, low to moderate partisan
conflict, and a limited basis for policy resolution.
Each pattern of policymaking suggests a different
challenge  for  achieving  policy  resolution.  Problems
that are characterized by fractured policymaking and
are hampered by partisan conflicts can be especially
difficult to overcome. Any prospect for reform would
seem to rest on effective coalition building as the ex-
amples of allied policymaking—financial reform, health
care  reform,  and  K-12  education—demonstrate.  Yet
such reform policymaking entails  transitory  and un-
stable  coalitions  that  can  dissolve  and  weaken  the
political  basis  for  the reforms,  as discussed by Eric
Patashnik ([49], pp. 29–33). Bureaucratic policymak-
ing  suffers  from  the  inability  to  "lock  in"  policy
changes without legislative action. The challenges of
anemic  policymaking  are  particularly  acute  in  that
they lack the interest bases for mobilizing action and
tend to fall through institutional cracks.
This  discussion raises at  least  two considerations
that merit consideration in future research. One is the
mechanisms for, and patterns in, the transformation of
problems from one category of policymaking to an-
other over time—in other words, the political dynam-
ics  of  problem processing.  We have  hinted  at  how
some problems (health care in particular) have moved
from  the  realm  of  fractured  policymaking  to  allied
policymaking. Here, the keys were coalition building in
support of more comprehensive policy. But clearly that
is difficult to achieve and any such coalition is likely to
be highly unstable. In this case, as in financial sector
reform, the degree of comprehensiveness waned as
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the  process  played  out.  Problems  characterized  by
bureaucratic policymaking take on new dynamics with
macro-political involvement, as illustrated by the 2010
reforms in food safety. Such transformations in bur-
eaucratic policymaking tend to be episodic and driven
by focusing events, as illustrated by the massive egg
recall in 2010, prompting food safety reform. We also
suggest that presidential administrative reforms have
the potential  for  converting anemic  policymaking to
bureaucratic  policymaking.  This  is  illustrated by  the
treatment of food safety in the past and the emerging
federal steps in addressing the obesity epidemic. But
we noted that such actions are limited in that they do
not  provide  the  necessary  constituency  or  political
support to be durable reforms.
A second future research direction gets at the reas-
ons why the political processing of problems take the
forms that they do. We have identified the policymak-
ing patterns for  various problems and the elements
that comprise each pattern, but we have not estab-
lished how these patterns come about. Put differently,
the patterns of policymaking do not occur by happen-
stance.  Different  interests  may  be  well  served  by
keeping the treatment of a given problem anemic or
on the back burner of government. Why, for example,
have  the  well-recognized  problems  associated  with
declining ocean health not been addressed? Or why
was the fractured system of monitoring the safety of
food that way for so long? In these and other similar
circumstances, it is evident that some interests benefit
from more limited policy actions. These same forces
are likely at work in establishing and maintaining the
institutional arrangements that channel policymaking
attention in particular ways either to foster or frag-
ment uniformity in attention.
Consideration of how fundamental forces in Amer-
ican politics limit the treatment of different problems
adds new insights for the study of public  policy. As
this contribution suggests, two lines of inquiry are es-
pecially relevant: how attention is channeled into dif-
ferent dimensions of problems within and across poli-
cymaking  institutions  and  how  interest-based  and
partisan politics are both affected by the channeling of
policymaking attention and help to limit it.
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